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Introduction
While confidential information has long been protected and managed in the
oil and gas industry through contract and the common law, the introduction
over the past thirty years of various access to information legislation,
whereby the public is granted a right to access records under the control
of a government institution subject to limited and specific exceptions, has
materially changed the landscape for how private commercial interests
interact and contract with the government.
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Of particular concern is the growing trend of political parties, the
press and competitors using the access to information legislation to obtain
significant and material commercial information about the activities,
prospects and strategies of the private commercial interests in the hands
of the government. It is now not uncommon to see access to information
requests being advanced in respect of major new government proposals
or initiatives in respect of the oil and gas industry. Of equal concern is
the use of access to information requests to fish for information in the
midst of litigation, where the rules of court would not allow access to the
information, or to access information to ground an action where there is
merely suspicion of an actionable wrong.
Similarly, in the wake of the so-called "sponsorship scandal," the
Gomery Commission produced a report criticizing the actions of senior
public officials and their secrecy. The report found that while "[t]here are
valid arguments for secrecy concerning certain government operations...
the arguments in favor of secrecy have been over-emphasized since the
[access to information] legislation was first proclaimed into force on July
1, 1983."' The report went on to say that: "[c]ountless individuals reported
that senior officials, both political and administrative, find various ways to
'2
deny providing information to the public."
With increased public scrutiny and an increasing sophistication in the
scope and focus of the access requests made each year, participants in the
oil and gas industry are well-advised to structure their interactions with
government to take advantage of the limited and specific exemptions, or
run the risk of their confidential information being disclosed.
In this paper, we seek to provide a practical overview of the landscape
and issues that can arise when a private entity interacts with the government.
First, we explore what is "confidential information," providing a foundation
for our subsequent discussion of the access to information legislation and
how it interacts with a private entity's confidential information. Second,
we describe the public policy that lead to the adoption of the access to
information legislation and the specific provisions that address how a
private entity's confidential information, in the hands of the government,
may be protected under such legislation. Finally, we look to the specific
example of how Newfoundland and Labrador has structured its access
legislation in the context of Nalcor Energy (Nalcor), and its subsidiary,
1. Privy Council Office, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising
Activities, RestoringAccountability: Recommendations(Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2005), online:
Government of Canada Publications <http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/287355/publication.html> at
179-180 [RestoringAccountability].
2.
Ibid at 43-44.
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Nalcor Energy-Oil and Gas Inc. (Nalcor Oil and Gas), in order to strike
a balance between public policy and the needs of the oil and gas industry.
I. Confidentialinformation and trade secrets
Before proceeding with an overview of the law of confidence, it should
be noted that there is a tendency in industry to use the terms "confidential
information" and "trade secrets" interchangeably. From a legal point
of view this can be somewhat misleading, as a trade secret is merely a
subset of confidential information.3 While it is true that all trade secrets
are confidential information, it is not necessarily true that all confidential
information is a trade secret. That being said, it is useful to first set out
what may constitute confidential information and trade, secrets, prior to
discussing confidential information in the hands of the government. As will
be discussed in further detail below, the distinction between confidential
information and trade secrets is important in the context of access to
information legislation.
1. Confidentialinformation defined
In its decision with respect to Lac Minerals Ltd. v. InternationalCorona
Resources Ltd.,4 the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the law of
confidential information and, commenting favourably on the decision of
Lord Greene in Saltman Engineering,5 adopted the following definition:
The information, to be confidential, must I apprehend, apart from contract,
have the necessary quality of confidence about it, namely, it must not be
something which is public property and public knowledge. On the other
hand, it is perfectly possible to have a confidential document, be it a
formula, a plan, a sketch, or something of that kind, which is the result of
work done by the maker upon materials which may be available for the
use of anybody; but what makes it confidential is the fact that the maker
of the document has used his brain and thus produced a result which can
only be produced by somebody who goes through the same process.6
Unfortunately, this broad definition has not been particularly useful in
determining whether or not a particular set of information is confidential
information capable of protection.
In an effort to refine this definition, Canadian courts continue to
employ, to'some degree, the following criteria when assessing whether or
not information disclosed in a given situation has the necessary quality of
confidentiality:
3.
4.
5.
6.

Cadbury Schweppes Inc v FBI Foods Ltd, [1999] 1 SCR 142 [Cadbury].
Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 574 [Lac Minerals].
Saltman Engineering Co v Campbell Engineering Co,(1948) 65 RPC 203 (CA) [Saltman].
Saltman, ibid, cited in Lac Minerals,supra note 4 at para 156.

Confidential Information and Governments

(a) [t]he extent to which the information is known outside the
business;
(b) [t]he extent to which it is known by employees and others'involved
in the business;
(c) [the extent of] [m]easures taken to guard the secrecy of the
information;
(d) [t]he value of the information to the holder of the secret and to his
competitors;
(e) [t]he [amount of] effort or money expended in developing the
information;
(f) [t]he ease or difficulty with which the information can be properly
acquired or duplicated by others;
(g) [w]hether the holder of the secret and the taker treat the information
as secret;
(h) custom in the industry concerning this specific type of information. 7
While these criteria are useful in assessing whether or not a particular set
of information would be considered confidential, they are not exhaustive
and may include criteria required for a trade secret. As such, we must
always return to the broad definition set down by Lord Greene in Saltman
engineering, adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada: "[t]he information,
to be confidential, must...have the necessary quality of confidence about
it, namely, it must not be something which is public property and public
knowledge."'
2. What is a trade secret?
Notwithstanding views to the contrary, the terms "trade secret" and
"confidential information'" are not synonymous. The Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Stewart,9 and again in Cadbury,'0 has held that a trade
secret is a subset of confidential information."
While it has been argued that the law of trade secrets should be
codified, 12 the definition has been left to the common law. Fortunately,
7.
GasTOPS Ltd v Forsyth, [2009] OJ No 3969 (QL) (ON Sup Ct) at para 124, aff'd 2012 ONCA
134, 288 OAC 201 [GasTOPS]; Stonetile (Canada)Ltd v Castcon Ltd, 2010 ABQB 392, 488 AR 375;
Ali Arc Industrieset al v S& V Manufacturing Ltd et al, 2011 MBQB 95, 265 Man R (2d) 1. See also
David Vaver, "Civil Liability for Taking or Using Trade Secrets in Canada" (1981) 5 Can Bus LJ 253
at 255-256.
8.
Saltman, supra note 5, cited in Lac Minerals, supranote 4 at para 156.
9.
R v Stewart, [1988] 1 SCR 963 [Stewart].
10. Cadbury, supra note 3.
11. Lamer J commented in Stewart,supra note 9 at paia 23 that "a trade secret... is a particular kind
of confidential information...."
12. Institute of Law Research and Reform and a Federal Provincial Working Party, Trade Secrets
(Edmonton, 1986), online: <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/fr046.pdf>.
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the courts have, from time to time, undertaken detailed analyses of the
case law and have restated the definition. For example, we can look to
Brockenshire J, in Dent Wizard International Corp. v. Long,13 quoting
Chevrier J in Crain Ltd. v. Ashton et al,'4 who employed the following
definitions of a trade secret:
(1) A trade secret.. .is a property right,15 and differs from a patent in
that as soon as the secret is discovered, either by an examination
of the product or any other honest way, the discoverer has the full
right of using it...
(2)

A trade secret is a plan or process, tool, mechanism, or compound
known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is
necessary to confide it.

(3)

The term 'trade secret' as usually understood, means a secret
formula or process not patented, but known only to certain
individuals, used in compounding some article of trade having
a commercial value, and does not denote the mere privacy with
which an ordinary commercial business is carried on..
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it. A trade secret is a process
or device for continuous use in the operation of the business. The
16
subject matter of a trade secret must be secret.

(4)

On the basis that a trade secret can exist in the original combination,
characteristics of components, or in the unique design of the product as a
whole, it is interesting to note that a product may still be protected under
trade secret notwithstanding that all of its the components are in the public
domain. 7
Whether or not a particular set of information is a trade secret is a
question of fact and "the onus rests on the plaintiff to establish the

13. Dent Wizard InternationalCorp v Long, [1996] OJ No 4702 (QL) (Ct J Gen Div) [Dent].
14. RI Crain Ltd v RW& Ashton Press ManufacturingCo, [1949] OWN 246 (H Ct J).
15. Given the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Cadbury,supranote 3, and the discussion
of the sui generis nature of confidential information contained therein, one should not rely on the
statement that a trade secret is a "proprietary" right.
16. Dent, supra note 13 at para 18.
17. Computer Workshops Ltd v Banner Capital.MarketBrokers Ltd (1988), 64 OR (2d) 266 (ON H
Ct J), cited in Gas TOPS, supra note 7 at para 135.
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confidential nature of the information."'I In establishing whether or not the
information is a trade secret, it is useful to employ the following criteria:
1. the information must be specific, not general;.
2.

the information is treated as confidential, and regarded as secret,
by the company;

3. the information must not be generally known to the public, but it
may be acquired from materials available to the public with the
expenditure of time and effort; and
4.

the information should only be given to employees on a need to
know basis, and to third parties provided they agree'not to disclose
it without the express authorization of the company.' 9

Therefore, for a trade secret to exist one would need to prove that the
information in question was more than merely information that has the
"necessary quality of confidence." For example, in the oil and gas industry,
seismic data is treated as confidential information. That being said, it is a
question of fact whether or not the specific geophysical data resulting from
a seismic survey is capable of being construed as a trade secret. Certainly,
the know-how relating to obtaining and acquiring the geophysical data
could qualify as a process or methodology capable of being protected as
a trade secret. However, it is unclear whether the actual raw data itself
is capable of being construed as a trade secret. As discussed below, this
can be an important distinction in the context of the access to information
legislation.
In analyzing whether the raw data is a trade secret or not, it is important
to realize that trade secrets generally deal with applied science: the process
of changing something into something else. Unfortunately, raw data
concerning the geophysical formations is not information about a process,
and as such may not be protected under a strict definition of trade secret.
3. Breach of confidence
In attempting to define "confidential information," it is also helpful to
review the requirements that the courts have imposed before granting a
remedy in respect of a breach of confidence. In its decision in Computer
Workshops Ltd. v. Banner CapitalMarketBrokersLtd.,20 the Ontario Court
18. ConsolidatedTextiles Ltd v CentralDynamics Ltd, [1974] 2 FC 814, cited in Dent, supranote 13
at para 19.
19. See Software Solutions Associates Inc v Depow, [1989] 99 NBR (2d) 110 at para 71 (QB (TD)),
cited in CPC InternationalInc v Seaforth CreameryInc (1996), 69 CPR (3d) 297 at para 22 (ON Ct J
Gen Div).
20. Computer Workshops Ltdv Banner CapitalMarketBrokers Ltd(1990), 1 OR (3d) 398 (ONCA).
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of Appeal relied upon the following quote from Lord Greene MR's seminal
decision in Saltman Engineering:
If a defendant is proved to have used confidential information, directly
or indirectly obtained from a plaintiff, without the consent, express
or implied of the plaintiff, he will be guilty of an infringement of the
plaintiff's rights."
Initially adopted by the Supreme Court in Lac Minerals, it is now settled
that the test for breach of confidence in Canada consists of establishing
the following three elements: (i) that the information conveyed was
confidential; (ii) that it.
was communicated in confidence; and (iii) that it
22
was misused by the party to whom it was communicated.
The test is objective. As Granger J explained in GasTOPS:
The courts have used a 'reasonable person' test to determine whether
information embodies the necessary quality of confidence. The courts
examine whether a person, acting reasonably, should have expected the
information to be confidential: if the person should have realized that the
information was to be maintained in privacy, there will be an implied
obligation to maintain it in confidence. In Coco v AN Clark (Engineers)
Ltd, Megarry J stated:
It seems to me that if the circumstances are such that any reasonable
man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would
have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was
being given to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose
upon his the equitable obligation of confidence. In particular, where
information of commercial or industrial value is given on a businesslike basis and with some avowed common object-in mind, such as
a joint venture...I would regard the recipient as carrying a heavy
burden if he seeks to repel a contention that he was bound by an
obligation of confidence. 3
In Tree Savers InternationalLtd. v. Savoy, the Alberta Court of Appeal
cited the Supreme Court of Canada in Lac Minerals, and the finding that
"there [may]... be a breach of confidence even though there ha[s] been no
24
express warning that.. .the information was confidential."
What happens to a third party who receives the confidential information
of another? It is relatively settled law that a third party who has knowledge
of a confidence is bound by it, and if the third party breaches the confidence,
the disclosing party has the same remedies that it would have as against
21.
22.
23.
24.

Saltman, supra note 5, cited in Lac Minerals,supra note 4.
Lac Minerals,supranote 4 at para 129.
[1969]RPC41 at48.
TreeSavers InternationalLtd v Savoy (1992), 120 AR 368 (ABCA).
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the confidant. 25 For example, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Cadbury,
held:
Equity will pursue the information into the hands of a third party who
receives it with the knowledge that it was communicated in breach of
confidence (or afterwards acquires notice of that fact even if innocent at
the time of acquisition) and imposes its remedies.26
Again, the test in this instance is an objective one. In London & Provincial
Sporting News Agency v. Levy, 27 the court found the third party recipient
of confidential information liable for breach of confidence where the third
party knew or ought to have known that the information came from the
plaintiff, or at any rate the third party had a very certain suspicion that it
was the plaintiff's information and had deliberately refrained from asking
a direct question.
In Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No 2),
Megarry VC stated:
If A makes a confidential communication to B, then A may not only
restrain B from divulging or using the confidence, but also may restrain
C from divulging or using it if C has acquired it from B, even if he
acquired it without notice of any impropriety.... In such cases it seems
plain that, however innocent the acquisition of the knowledge, what will
be restrained is the use or disclosure of it after notice of the impropriety. 28
Therefore, users of confidential information must be vigilant in ensuring
that the information that they receive is provided to them in a manner that
guarantees they can use such information without concern that such use
may violate a confidence of a third party. Also, the users must have adequate
protocols in place to ensure that they can stop using any information for
which they receive notice of such an obligation.
4. Confidential information in the hands of the government
As a heavily regulated industry, oil and gas companies are often
required to provide their confidential information to various government
authorities by statute, royalty agreements or other prescribed procedures. 29
Unfortunately, there is very little case law dealing with the effect of
compulsory disclosure of confidential information under statute.

25. International.Tools LtdvKollar, [1968] 1 OR 669 (ONCA).
26. Cadbury,supra note 3 at para 19.
27. London & ProvincialSporting News Agency v Levy, [ 1928], MacG Cop Cas 340.
28. Malone v Commissionerof Police of the Metropolis (No 2), [1979] 2 All ER 620 (Ch).
29. See, e.g., the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board or the Canada-Nova Scotia
Offshore Petroleum Board.
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The leading text, often quoted by the courts, is Breach of Confidence,
where the author, Gurry, argues that there exists two classes of statutes
that affect the confidential nature of information disclosed. The first class
consists of compulsory public disclosure of specified information (e.g.,
certain Companies Acts and the requirements therein to file financial
statements). The second class consists of those statutes that do not
require compulsory public disclosure, but which may require only limited
disclosure of specific information to government departments, agencies or
other designated bodies.30 The author states:
In general, the disclosure required by this type of statute does not destroy
the confidentiality of information, for the number of people given access
to the information is limited and, normally, they are obliged by the statute
to respect its confidentiality. 3
Gurry further states:
Most of the statutes which require some form of compulsory disclosure
fall into this latter category. In every case, however, it will depend
entirely on the provisions of the relevant statute and these should be
consulted in order to determine the extent of disclosure required, and the
size of the audience to whom disclosure must be made. If the audience
is the public at large, then the information will lose any confidential
characteristics it might otherwise have on disclosure. If, however, the
audience is a limited one consisting of a [g]ovemment department or
official, then confidentiality is still possible. 2
In addition, Gurry states that:
In principle, the courts have recognized that an obligation of confidence
may attach to a [s]tate agency empowered to acquire information from
subjects.33

In support of this position, Gurry points to Lord Reid's dicta, in Conway v.
Rimmer,34 wherein Lord Reid states:
If the state insists on a man disclosing his private affairs for a particular
purpose it requires a very strong case to justify that disclosure being used

for other purposes.35

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Francis Gurry, Breach ofConfidence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
Ibid at 87.
Ibid at 87-88.
Ibid at 227.
Conway v Rimmer, [1968] AC 910 at 946.
Gurry, supranote 30 at 227-228.
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In Canada, the courts have had a number of opportunities to consider the
obligations of a government agency to balance the public interest in access
to information with the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
third party information obtained by an agency.36 In upholding the decision
of the Patented Medicine Review Board to not release information of a
third party, the Federal Court found in CIBA-Geigy CanadaLtd. v. Canada
(PatentedMedicine PricesReview Board)37 that because the Board and its
staff received a constant supply of information in respect to the pricing of
medicines, the scheme under the PatentAct was similar to other statutory
schemes (such as the Canadian Radio-Television Telecommunications
Commission and the National Energy Board) designed to .regulate
monopolies. The Court, in this instance, stated,
[i]n my view, information supplied pursuant to a "statutory authority for
purposes of economic regulation is, prima facie, confidential."3
The Court agreed that the Board had properly decided not to disclose all
of the information in its possession, as certain aspects of the information
included third party confidential information, which if released, may have
impacted the Board's ability to collect further third party confidential
information in the future, and thus reduce its ability to meet its legislated
mandate.39
This theme of protection of confidential information in the hands of a
government agency is picked up again in CrestbrookForestIndustriesLtd.
v. Canada,wherein the plaintiff appealed an income tax assessment from
Revenue Canada that was based on a report prepared from information on
commissions and discounts allowed to buyers of the pulp and newsprint
industry. This information was voluntarily provided to Revenue Canada
on the basis that it would be received in the strictest of confidence. In
determining that the confidential information would be restricted in its
disclosure to counsel and expert advisors involved in the reassessment,
the trial court indicated that there is a clear public interest in the need
of the plaintiff to prove its case, which must be balanced with the needs
of the interveners (information suppliers) to have the confidentiality of
information submitted to Revenue Canada protected. Accordingly, the

36. See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Can Ltd v Canada(PatentedMedicine PricesReview Board), [1994] 3 FC
425 (FCTD) [Ciba];Apotex Inc v Canada(AG), (1993) 63 FTR 197 (TD); Merck Frost CanadaInc v
Canada(Ministerof NationalHealth and Welfare), [1994] FCJ No 404 (TD) (QL).
37. Ciba, supra note 36.
38. 1bidatpara 27.
39. lbid at paras 30-32.
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Court of first instance found a balance between disclosure and protection
40
of the confidential information.
The Federal Court of Appeal found that Joyal J had not taken into
consideration the fact that the documents in question were obtained by
the Crown from taxpayers on a voluntary basis and for a specific and
defined purpose.4' As such, the Crown was not entitled to make use of
that information for a different purpose in circumstances where such
use would inevitably result in breach of the Crown's undertaking in
confidence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision at trial
and denied disclosure of the documents. In reaching their decision, the
Court of Appeal referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Lac Minerals,where LaForest, J., speaking for the majority, said:
In establishing a breach of duty of confidence, the relevant question to be
asked is, 'what is the confidee entitled to do with the information?' and
not, 'to what use he is prohibited from putting it?' Any use other than
a permitted use is prohibitedand amounts to a breach of duty. When
information is provided in confidence, the obligation is on the confidee
to show
that the use to which he put the information is not a prohibited
42
use.

It would appear, therefore, that the law in Canada is that confidential
information provided to the Crown for a specific purpose does not entitle
the Crown to use that information for any other purpose, especially where
such use would inevitably result in a breach of the Crown's undertaking
of confidence.
It is useful to note that in Alberta, a successful action for breach of
confidence was maintained against the Province of Alberta. In the case of
PharandSki Corp., the plaintiff corporation provided information to the
provincial government regarding Mount Allan as a viable ski hill site for
the Olympics and as a recreational ski area thereafter.4 3 The corporation
provided a confidential analysis in support of their view, in confidence.
The corporation asked for and received confirmation from the government
that their report would be kept confidential; however, the government did
release the confidential information to the Olympic Organizing Committee
as well as other individuals, resulting in the corporation being excluded
from the development of the site for which they spearheaded the analysis.

40.
41.
42.
43.

CrestbrookForest IndustriesLtd v Canada, (1991), 48 FTR 225 (TD).
CrestbrookForest IndustriesLtd v Canada (1992), 41 CPR (3d) 34 (FTR).
Ibid at para 6 [emphasis in original].
PharandSki Corp vAlberta (1991), 116 AR 326 (QB).
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The court awarded the corporation damages in excess of $1.3 million.
Given that the corporation received assurances of confidentiality from the
government, this case shows that:
(1) confidential information provided to a government agency retains
its confidential nature; and
(2) the government can be liable for breach of confidence.
II. Access to information legislation
The historical attempts to legislate privacy and access to information span
several sessions of Parliament over almost twenty years as Canadians
grappled with how to balance the public's right to access the records and
information of their government with the legitimate need to have certain
exceptions to such right.
Starting in 1965, there were various attempts by MP Barry Mather
to introduce such legislation, but none of these went further than Second
Reading. MP Gerald Baldwin attempted to bring forward access to
information legislation on several occasions beginning in 1973, but
he too failed. In the 1976 Throne Speech, the Liberals announced they
would prepare a Green Paper on freedom of information." However, even
before that paper was tabled, opposition MP Gerald Baldwin made strong
assertions about the contents that the legislation should have and considered
the objections by the governing party to open government and court review
of disclosure denials to be indefensible.45 In 1979 the Conservatives
introduced Bill C-15, which contained the Freedom of Information Act.46
Bill C-15 died when the minority Conservative government fell.
Finally, in the 1980 Liberal Throne Speech, the government promised
to introduce freedom of information legislation. On 17 July 1980,
the government introduced Bill C-43,47 An Act to enact the Access to
InformationAct and the Privacy Act, to amend the Federal CourtAct and
the CanadaEvidence Act andto amend certain other acts in consequence
thereof; it was proclaimed in force I July 1983.48

44. "Speech from the Throne," House of Commons Debates, 30th Parl, 2nd Sess (12 October 1976)
at 3.
45. House of Commons Debates, 30th Parl, 2nd Sess, (25 October 1976) at 428 (Hon Gerald
Baldwin).
46. Bill C-15, 1st Sess, 31stParl, 1979.
47. Bill C-43, Ist Sess, 32nd Parl, 1980.
48. Michel W Drapeau & Marc-Aur~le Racicot, Federal Access to Information and Privacy
Legislation Annotated 2012 (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at xv.
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Following the introduction of the federal Access to Information Act, 49
each of the provinces and territories has adopted similar legislation (shown
in order of commencement date):
JURISDICTION

NAME OF LEGISLATION

Federal

Access to InformationAct,
RSC 1985, cA-1

7 July 1982

3 August 2007

Ontario

Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, RSO
1990, c F-31

I January 1988

1 January 1998

Saskatchewan

Freedom of Information and
Protectionof Privacy Act, SS
1990-91, c F-22.01

1 April 1992

1April 1992

British Columbia

Freedom of Information and
Protection of PrivacyAct,
RSBC 1996, c 165

30 June 1992

28 March 2003

Nova Scotia

Freedom of Information and
Protectionof PrivacyAct, SNS
1993, c 5

1 July 1994

1 July 1994

Yukon

Access to Information and
Protectionof PrivacyAct, RSY
2002, c I

3 May 1995

3 May 1995

Alberta

Freedom of Information and
Protectionof PrivacyAct, RSA
2000, c F-25

1 October 1995

16 May 2003

Northwest
Territories

Access to Information and
Protectionof Privacy Act,
SNWT 1994, c 20

31 December 1996

31 December
1996

Nunavut

Access to Information and
Protectionof Privacy Act,
SNWT (Nu) 1994, c 20

31 December 1996

31 December
1996

Manitoba

Freedom of Information and
Protectionof PrivacyAct,
CCSM c F 175

4 May 1998

4 May 1998

Prince Edward
Island

Freedom of Information and
Protectionof PrivacyAct,
RSPEI 1988, c F-15.01

1 November 2002

15 December
2005

Newfoundland
and Labrador

Access to Information and
Protectionof Privacy Act, SNL
2002, c A-1 .1

17 January 2005

17 January 2005

New Brunswick

Right to Information and
Protectionof Privacy Act, SNB
2009, c R-10.6

19 June 2009

COMMENCEMENT
DATE

THIRD PARTY
SECTION 5 0

19 June 2009

49. Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-I [AliA].
50. Indicates last change to "disclosure harmful to business interests of a third party" section in
noted legislation.
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Although not identical, each law is generally based on the same
principle, which can best be seen through the purpose statements for such
legislation. For example, section 2 of the AIA states:
Purpose

2.(1) The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws of Canada
to provide a right of access to information in records under the control
of a government institution in accordance with the principles that
government information should be available to the public, that necessary
exceptions to the right of access should be limited and specific and
that decisions on the disclosure of government information should be
reviewed independently of government.
Complementaryprocedures

(2) This Act is intended to complement and not replace existing
procedures for access to government information and is not intended
to limit in any way access to the type of 51
government information that is
normally available to the general public.
In the instant case, we are concerned with the application of this purpose
to the information that the oil and gas industry regularly provides to the
federal and provincial governments and, in particular, how the oil and gas
industry may best protect its interests by structuring its affairs to capitalize
on the specific exemptions to disclosure within the access to information
legislation applicable to it.
1. Understandingthe statutory structure
a. Federal
Akin to its provincial counterparts, the A1A protects, among other types
of information, financial, scientific, technical and commercial information
so long as the applicable third party consistently treats such information

51. AIA, supra note 49, s 2. This was contained in Sched. 1,s2 of the 1983 Act, but when.the Act
was revised in 1985 it became simply section 2. The clause is the same today as it was in 1983. For
example, the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSA 2000, c F-25, s2 [Alberta
Act], states:
"The purposes of this Act are: (a) to allow any person a right'of access to the records in the
custody or under the control of a public body subject to limited and specific exceptions as
set out in this Act, (b) to control the manner in which a public body may collect personal
information from individuals, to control the use that a public body may make of that
information and to control the disclosure by a public body of that information, (c) to allow
individuals, subject to limited and specific exceptions as set out in this Act, a right of
access to personal information about themselves that is held by a public body, (d) to allow
individuals a right to request corrections to personal information about themselves that is
held by a public body, and (e) to provide for independent reviews of decisions made by
public bodies under this Aci and the resolution of complaints under this Act.
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supplied to a public body as confidential.52 Unlike some provincial
legislation, the AIA does not additionally require that the disclosure of this
information could reasonably be expected to, for example, significantly
harm the competitive position of the third party, or result in undue
financial loss or gain to any person or organization. As such, the head
of a federal public body (or, more likely, the applicable third party) must
only demonstrate that the information supplied to the public body was
consistently treated as confidential by the third party in order to preclude
its disclosure.
In addition to protecting the foregoing, the AIA also protects: (i) "trade
secrets of a third party53 ; (ii) certain emergency management plans that
may concern the "vulnerability of [a] third party's buildings, structures,
networks or systems"54 ; (iii) information, the "disclosure of which could
reasonably be expected to result in material financial loss or gain to, or
prejudice the competitive position of, a third party"55 ; and (iv) information,
the "disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with
contractual or other negotiations of a third party."56 The Act also protects
information containing the "results of product or environmental testing"
carried out by, or on behalf of, government, 7 as well as any "written
explanation of the methods used" in conducting such tests.58 The foregoing
notwithstanding, the AIA provides that the head of a public body may
disclose any of the foregoing types of information if the third party
consents to its release,59 or where "disclosure [of such information] would
be in the public interest [if] it relates to public health, public safety or the
protection of the environment.60
b. Alberta
Like the AIA, Alberta's Freedom of Information and Protectionof Privacy
Act 6' sets out specific exceptions to the general rights of access. For
example, section 16 protects information that, if released, would harm a
third party's business interests. More specifically, this provision protects
information that would reveal trade secrets or commercial, financial,
52. AIA, supranote 49, s 20(1)(a).
53. Ibid, s 20(1)(b).
54. ]bid, s 20(1)(b.1).
55. Ibid, s 20(1)(c).
56. Ibid, s 20(1)(d).
57. Other than "preliminary testing conducted for the purpose of developing methods of testing."
lbid, ss 20(2), 20(4).
58. Ibid, s 20(3).
59. Ibid, s 20(5).
60. Ibid, s 20(6).
61. Alberta Act, supranote 51.
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labour relations or technical information of a third party, which has been
supplied, either "explicitly or implicitly, in confidence. 6 2 Unlike the AA,
such information, if released, must be "reasonably expected to":
(i)
(ii)

(iii)
(iv)

harm significantly the competitive position or interfere
significantly with the negotiating position of the third party,
result in similar information no longer being supplied to
the public body when it is in the public interest that similar
information continue to be supplied,
result in undue financial loss or gain to any person or
organization, or
reveal information supplied to, or the report of, an arbitrator,
mediator, labour relations officer or other person or body
appointed to resolve or inquire into a labour relations dispute.63

Subsection 16(3), however, provides exceptions under which information
can be released under the Act. In effect, disclosure may be made by a
public body where: (i) the third party has consented; (ii) an Alberta or
Federal enactment authorized the disclosure; (iii) the information relates
to a non-arm's length transaction involving the public body; or (iv) where
the information is under the control of the Provincial Archives or is more
than 49 years old.
Any information to which this Act applies must be disclosed by a
public body if it relates to a "risk of significant harm to the environment
or to the'6' health or safety of the public," or if it is "clearly in the public
interest."
c. Newfoundland and Labrador
The Newfoundland and Labrador Access to Information and Protection
of PrivacyAct 65 is organized similarly to Alberta's Act, and allows for the
potential to protect a third party's trade secrets, or commercial, financial,
66
labour relations, scientific and technical information.
Unlike the aforementioned four exceptions provided under subsection
16(3) of Alberta's Act, section 27(3) of ATIPPA states that the exceptions
to disclosure prescribed under section 27 do not apply if: "(a) the third
party consents to the disclosure; or (b) the information is in a record that is
in the custody or control of the Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Ibid, s 16(1)(a)(i),(ii).
Ibid,s 16(1)(c).
Ibid,s 32(1)(a) & (b).
Access to Information and Protectionof PrivacyAct, SNL 2002.c A-I.1 [ATIPPA].
bid, s 27.
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Labrador or the archives of a public body.. .that [have] been in existence
for 50 years or more." Of note is the fact that ATIPPA does not provide
an exception for: (i) an enactment of Newfoundland and Labrador or
Canada authorizing or requiring the information to be disclosed; or (ii) the
information relates to a nonarm's length transaction between a public body
and another party.
d. Otherprovinces
All the Canadian common law provinces have comparable provisions
protecting third party information from requests for information. The
Ontario statute, which has been litigated more than the other provincial
statutes, is similar to the legislated scheme ofthe Alberta and Newfoundland
legislation: the applicable information, for example, must have been
provided in confidence, either implicitly or explicitly, and if disclosed is
67
reasonably expected to cause one of the same four results.
The provisions governing the third party business exception in British
Columbia, Manitoba, the Yukon, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince
Edward Island, are nearly identical to the Alberta and Newfoundland
provisions. 68 The acts in Saskatchewan and the Northwest Territories are
also similar, but provide specific protections for information given to the
government in connection with financial assistance. 69 For further details
with respect to each of the applicable acts, see Appendix A.
2. Judicial considerationof the thirdparty business information
exception
a. Generaltest
As above, the following three-part test generally governs the application of
the third party business information exception under provincial legislation:
(1)

the record must reveal information that is a trade secret or
scientific, technical, commercial, financial or labour relations
information;

67. Freedom of Information and ProtectionofPrivacyAct, RSO 1990, c F-31, s 17(1) [OntarioAct].
68. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165, s 21 [BC Act];
Freedom ofInformation and Protectionof Privacy Act, CCSM c F 175, s 18 [ManitobaAct]; Access to
Information and ProtectionofPrivacyAct, RSY 2002, c 1 s24(1) [ Yukon Act]; Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act, SNS 1993, c 5, s 21 [Nova Scotia Act]; Right to Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, SNB 2009, c R- 10.6, s 22 [New Brunswick Act]; Freedom of Information
and Protectionof Privacy Act, RSPEI 1988, c F- 15.01, s 14 [PrinceEdivard Island Act]; AFIPPA,
supra note 65, s 27.
69. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01, s 19
[Saskatchewan Act]; Access of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNWT 1994, c 20, s 24
[Nortnvest TerritoriesAct].
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(2)
(3)

the information must have been supplied to the [government
body] in confidence, either implicitly or explicitly; and
the prospect of disclosure must give rise to a reasonable
expectation that one of the [specified] injuries-significant
prejudice to a competitive position, significant interference with
contractual or other negotiations, similar information no longer
being supplied to the government institution, or undue loss or
gain-Will occur. 7°

b. Type of information
The legislation and case law generally indicates that the first step in the
analysis is the determination of whether or not the record reveals specific
types of information. The exception will only apply if the information is
a trade secret or scientific, technical, commercial, financial or related to
labour relations.
In the recent case Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of
Health),71 the Federal Court of Appeal dealt with several issues connected
to the expectation under the AIA and set out the test: "the information
[must] be financial, commercial, scientific or technical; [as well as]
confidential; and [have been] consistently treated as confidential. 7 2 The
analysis of whether the information is financial, commercial, scientific
or technical will precede the confidentiality analysis. For example, in
Chippewas of Nawash First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Indian and
Northern Affairs),73 Rothstein JA found that certain records, although
confidential, did not fit within the allowed categories of information.
Thus, the records were not protected under the exception. The confidential
nature of the information was irrelevant.74
Trade secret
The courts have indicated that for the purposes of the AIA, a trade secret
will be interpreted narrowly. A party relying on section 21(l)(a), for
example, will have to provide "specific, objective, and detailed evidence"

70. Ontario Act, supra note 67, s 17(1)(a); Ontario (Workers' Compensation Board) v Ontario
(Assistant Information & Privacy Commissioner) (1998), 41 OR (3d) 464, at paras 22-28. See also
Ontario First Nations Ltd Partnershipv Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (2006),
209 OAC 158 at para 8; Atlantic Highways Corp (Re), [1997] NSJ No 238 at para 29.
71. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd v Canada (Minister of Health), 2009 FCA 166, 179 ACWS (3d) 2
[Merck].
72. Ibid at para 63.
73. Chippewas of Nawash First Nation v Canada (Minister ofIndian & Northern Affairs) (2009),
177 FTR 160 (FCA) [Chippewas].
74. Ibid at para 5.,
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that the "information [is] a trade secret" and meet "a high threshold. '75
As previously discussed, a trade secret is highly technical in nature, such
as the physical composition of product or a manufacturing process, and
inherently confidential.7 6
Financialinformation
In Chippewas, records of correspondence, meeting minutes, and
resolutions connected to certain First Nations were held not to be
financial information. Some of the records referred to land and Rothstein
JA dismissed the argument that reference to an asset was sufficient to
qualify a document as financial information. He concluded by stating that
"[without defining what financial information consists of, we are satisfied
that merely because documents contain references to land, they do not
'77
constitute financial information.
Commercialinformation
Commercial information has been defined as information that relates
solely to the buying, selling or exchange of merchandise and goods. 78 In
OntarioFirstNations, records that spoke to accountability measures were
not considered to be commercial information as they did not involve the
"exchange of merchandise or services."
Labour relations
In the context of the Nova Scotia Act, the courts have favoured an
expansive definition of "labour relations" that includes worker-employer
relationships regardless of whether the relationship is governed by a
collective bargaining agreement.79
c.

Confidential information supplied by a thirdparty

Supplied by the thirdparty
The information at issue must have been "supplied" by the third party
and therefore, the courts have held that negotiated agreements between
the third party and the government agency will not generally meet this

75. Merck, supra note 71 at para 54.
76. Astrazeneca Inc v Canada (Health), 2005 FC 189 at paras 62-65, 275 FTR 133, cited in Merck,
supra note 71 at para 53.
77. Chippevas,supra note 73 at para 5.
78.

Ontario First Nations Ltd Partnershipv Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner),

(2006) 209 OAC 158 at para 9 (ON Sup Ct J).
79. Halifax Herald Ltd v Nova Scotia (Workers 'Compensation Board), 2008 NSSC 369 at paras 54
& 56 [HalifaxHerald].
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criterion. 0 As Kelen J held in Aventis Pasteur Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney
General):
To hold otherwise would broaden the scope of the exemption and prevent
the public from having access to much of the information contained in
government contracts.
If, however, an agreement contains attachments or information that was
supplied by the third party and otherwise meets the requirements for the
exception, those aspects of the agreement may not be subject to disclosure.8 2
Determining whether information contained in an agreement between
the government and a third party was supplied by the third party, will be
informed by whether the information is immutable and whether it may
indirectly disclose confidential information that was supplied by a third
party. Information supplied by the third party will be considered immutable
where it is not susceptible to change. For example, information regarding
third party contract costs will not generally be susceptible to be changed
through negotiations. Thus, it will often be considered information
supplied by a third party. On the other hand, if a third party provides a bid
or offer to the government, which is then incorporated into an agreement,
this information is susceptible to modification by negotiation. Therefore it
will generally not be considered to have been provided by the third party.
The susceptibility or possibility that the information may be modified by
negotiation is the relevant factor, not whether the information actually is
modified by negotiation. However, this consideration is not a test, but is
only a factor to be assessed in considering whether a particular piece of
information was supplied by a third party.83
An agreement may also contain information that will meet the
"supplied" criterion if the negotiated information allows a reasonably
informed observer to accurately infer underlying confidential information.'
Confidential
Confidentiality, as discussed previously, depends on the content, purpose,
circumstances of its compilation and communication of the information.
80. CanadaPostCorp v NationalCapitalCommission, 2002 FCT 700, 221 FTR 56; Aventis Pasteur
Ltdv Canada (AG), 2004 FC 1371, 262 FTR 73 [Aventis Pasteur].
81. Ibid at para 23.
82. Boeing Co v Ontario (Ministry of Economic Development and Trade), (2005) 200 OAC 134 at
para 20. See also CanadianProtective Assn v Loukidelis (2008), 298 DLR (4th) 134 (ON Sup Ct).
83. CanadianPacific Railway v British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2002
BCSC 603 at paras 70-77, 2002 CarswellBC 1022 (WL Can) [CPR]. See also Jill Schmidt Health
Services Inc v British Columbia (Informationand Privacy Commissioner), 2001 BCSC 101 at paras
32-39, 102 ACWS (3d) 449.
84. CPR, ibid.
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In Air Atonabee Ltd v Canada (Minister of Transport) (1989),85 this
assessment was broken down into three parts. Firstly, the content of the
information should not available to the public, nor should it be accessible
to a member of the public through his own observation or independent
study.86 To be considered available to the public, the information need
not be available from a single public source, it can require time and
expense to collect. 7 Secondly, the information should originate and be
communicated in a reasonable expectation of confidence that it will not be
disclosed. Thirdly, information should have been communicated within a
relationship with the government that is either a fiduciary relationship or
one that is not contrary to the public interest and that relationship will be
fostered for public benefit by confidential communication." It is on this
basis that the Federal Court of Appeal ruled in Canada (MinisterofPublic
Works and Government Services) v. Hi-Rise Group Inc., that a third party
"could not reasonably expect that amounts paid or payable to it out of
public funds pursuant to the ensuing contract would remain confidential
by reason of the fact that the process which led to the grant of the contract
was confidential."89
Relying upon a permutation of those stated above, the British Columbia
Privacy Commissioner considered the phrase "received in confidence"
from section 16 of the British Columbia Freedom of Information and
Protectionsof PrivacyAct,9" and outlined seven relevant factors:
1. What is the nature of the information? Would a reasonable person
regard it as confidential? Would it ordinarily be kept confidential by
the supplier or recipient?
2. Was the record prepared for a purpose that would not be expected to
require or lead to disclosure in the ordinary course?
3. Was the record in question explicitly stated to be provided in
confidence? (This may not be enough in some cases, since other
evidence may show that the recipient in fact did not agree to receive
the record in confidence or may not actually have understood there
was a true expectation of confidentiality.)
85. Air Atonabee Ltd v Canada(Minister of Transport) (1989), 27 FTR 194 (TD) [Air Atonabee].
86. Ibid at 210, quoted with approval in Merck, supra note 72 at para 65; CanadianImperial Bank
of Commerce v Canada (Chief Commissioner,Human Rights Commission), 2007 FCA 272 at para
61, [2008] 2 FCR 509 [CIBC]; HJHeinz Co of Canada Ltd v Canada(AG), 2006 SCC 13 at para 51,
[2006] 1 SCR 441.
87. Cyanamid CanadaInc v Canada(Minister ofNational Healthand Welfare), [1992] FCJ no 950
(QL), (1992) 45 CPR 3d 390 (FCA) at 403 (in CPR).
88. Air Atonabee, supra note 85 at 210.
89. Canada(MinisterofPublic Works and Government Services) v Hi-Rise Group Inc, 2004 FCA 99
at para 42, 238 DLR (4th) 44.
90. BCAct, supra note 68, s 16.
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4. Was the record supplied voluntarily or was the supply compulsory?
Compulsory supply will not ordinarily be confidential, but in
some cases there may be indications in legislation relevant to the
compulsory supply that establish confidentiality. (The relevant
legislation may even expressly state that such information is deemed
to have been supplied in confidence.)
5. Was there an agreement or understanding between the parties that
the information would be treated as confidential by its recipient?
6.. Do the actions of the public body and the supplier of the record
-including after the supply-provide objective evidence of an
expectation of or concern for confidentiality?
7. What is the past practice of the recipient public body respecting the
confidentiality of similar types of information when received from
the supplier or other similar suppliers?9
The Nova Scotia courts have adopted these factors as relevant to the
third party business interest expectation despite the slight difference in
wording. 92 The factors are applied in conjunction with the Air Atonabee
test. 93

d. Reasonable expectation of harm
The legislation sets out an exhaustive list of the effects of disclosure that
will trigger this exception. 94 There is very little case law dealing with these
individual categories. Rather, precedent has focused on the standard of
proof and evidentiary onus of establishing the requisite level of harm.
With respect to the competitive or negotiation position of a third party,
the harm must be "significant." To assess the significance of the harm, the
Alberta Act Guidelines and Practice (2009) states that a public body must
assess, among other things: (i) the nature of the information; (ii) the third
party's "representations regarding the harm involved"; (iii) if possible, an
"objective appraisal of that harm, including any monetary or other value
placed on it"; and (iv) the impact of the disclosure on the third party, and
its "ability to withstand this."95

91. Re Vancouver Police Board's Refusal to Disclose Complaint-Related Records, 1999 CanLIl
4253 (BC IPC).
92. Halifax Herald,supra note 79 at para 67; Keating v Nova Scotia (AG), 2001 NSSC 85, 194 NSR
(2d) 290 at para 56; Chesal v Nova Scotia (AG), 2003 NSCA 124 at para 76-77, 219 NSR (2d) 139.
93. Halifax Herald,supra note 79 at paras 77-90.
94. Jay Krushell, Annotated Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (Edmonton:
Queen's Printer of Alberta, 2010).
95. Government of Alberta, FO1P Guidelines and Practices. 2009 Edition, online: Service
Alberta <http://www.servicealberta.ca/foip/resources/guidelines-and-practices.cfin> at 106 [FOIP
Guidelines].
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The following test is often relied upon by the Alberta Privacy
Commissioner:
[T]here must be a clear cause and effect relationship between disclosure
ofthe withheld information and the outcome or harm alleged; the outcome
or harm that would be caused by the disclosure must constitute damage
or detriment and not simply hindrance or minimal interference; and the
96
likelihood of the outcome or harm must be genuine, and conceivable.
The Alberta Act Guidelines and Practice has also stated that the disclosure
of a third party's "history and general information about its plans" will
not result in "significant harm," while a third party's "strategic position
with respect to its dealings with one public body... intended to serve as
a blueprint for [its current and potential] commercial relationships with
other similar public bodies," will. 97 In relation to financial loss or gain,

the harm must result in an "undue" effect. Predictions of future harm must
be based on a reasonable expectation of harm. Meeting this standard will
generally require detailed and convincing evidence.9"
With respect to the reasonable expectation of loss or prejudice, the
party seeking to block disclosure must establish that loss or prejudice is
probable.99 The mere possibility of harm will not satisfy the requirements.
In Merck, for example, the court concluded that affidavit evidence speaking
to the "likely risk of significant commercial or financial repercussions"
was insufficient to warrant the application of the exception because the
"statements [were]... vague, speculative and silent as to specifically how
and why the disclosure of the requested information would be likely to
bring about the harm alleged."' l°
The party seeking to rely on the exception will have to provide
specific evidence as to how the information would be harmful and the
extent to which it will affect the third party. In CPR, evidence that certain
information would be harmful to a third party's negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement with employee unions was insufficient without
further details of the scope of the collective agreement and when it would
next be negotiated. 1 '

96.

Re Alberta Employment and Immigration,Order F2010-029, 2010 CanLlH 96618 at para 76 (AB

OIPC).
97. FOIP Guidelines,supra note 95 at 107.
98.

Ontario (Ministry of Transportation) v Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner)

(2005), 202 OAC 379 at para 37 (Ont CA).
99. Merck, supra note 71 at para 84.
100. lbid at paras 56, 93.
101. CPR, supra note 83 at paras 86, 88.
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In Halifax Herald,the trial judge found that disclosure of the twentyfive employers with the most workplace accidents would not cause those
employers significant harm. Embarrassment or stigmatism, without more,
will not likely meet the requirement of significant harm.'°
The court will not find a reasonable expectation of loss or a.prejudiced
competitive position if the information is otherwise available in the public
domain. 031 The specific information at issue must, however, be in the
public domain. Similar information, or even the same type of information,
will not suffice.'O4 In Rubin v. Canada (Minister of Health),"' Rothstein
JA explained that "the burden is on the [government] to provide evidence
that there has not been public disclosure of [the] information."'0 6 This will
likely be considered closely with the confidentiality requirements.
Given the relatively recent enactment of the many provincial access to
information acts, there is a paucity of case law that deals with the foregoing
business interests exemption, as the courts have not had the opportunity to
thoroughly consider and delineate the scope of this provision. As such, a
certain veil of uncertainty remains with respect to the extent to which this
provision can be relied upon by a third party to ptotect its information in
the hands of the government.
III. One province' approach-contractingwith Nalcor
Created pursuant to the Newfoundland Energy CorporationAct, 07
' Nalcor
was incorporated for the purpose of "invest[ing] in, engag[ing] in, and
carry[ing] out activities in all areas of the energy sector in [Newfoundland
and Labrador] and elsewhere,"'0 8 and to date has three subsidiaries: Nalcor
Oil and Gas, Nalcor Energy-Bull Arm Fabrication Inc., and Newfoundland
and Labrador Hydro (NL Hydro).
Recognizing that industry requires certainty when dealing with its
confidential information in the hands of the government, that it is in
Newfoundland and Labrador's interest to attract oil and gas investment,
and that the access to information regimes generally may create uncertainty
and thus act as impediment to investment, Nalcor Energy and each of its
subsidiaries, except NIL Hydro, the Province's publicly-owned generation

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Supra note 79.
Merck, supra note 71 at para 81.
CIBC, supra note 86 at para 61 (FCA).
Rubin v Canada(Minister of Health), 2003 FCA 37, 238 FTR 159.
lbid at para 4.
Energy CorporationAct, SNL 2007, c E- 11.01 [ECNL].
Ibid, s5(1).
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company, have a special exemption under ATIPPA (collectively, "Nalcor
Subsidiaries"). 109
Section 5.4 of the ECNL, which reads as follows, is integral to Nalcor's
ability to protect a third party's confidential information:
Notwithstanding section 6 of the Access to Informationand Protectionof
PrivacyAct, in addition to the information that shall or may be refused
under Part III of that Act, the chief executive officer of the corporation or
a subsidiary, or the head of another public body,
(a)

may refuse to disclose to an applicant under that Act commercially
sensitive information of the corporation or the subsidiary; and

(b)

shall refuse to disclose to an applicant under that Act commercially
sensitive information of a third party
where the chief executive officer of the corporation or the subsidiary to
which the requested information relates reasonably believes
(c)

that
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

the disclosure of the information may
harm the competitive position of,
interfere with the negotiating position of, or
result in financial loss or harm to the corporation, the
subsidiary or the third party; or

(d)

that information similar to the information requested to be disclosed
(i) is treated consistently in a confidential manner by the third
party, or
(ii) is customarily not provided to competitors by the corporation,
the subsidiary or the third party. [Emphasis added.] 1l0

In effect, this section states that the CEO of Nalcor or a Nalcor Subsidiary
may refuse to disclose commercially sensitive information to an
applicant where the CEO reasonably believes that disclosure may harm
the competitive position, interfere with negotiating position, or result in
financial loss or harm to the corporation.
In addition, the CEO of such a corporation may refuse disclosure if that
information or similar information is treated consistently in a confidential
manner by a third party or is ordinarily not provided to competitors by the
corporation or the third party. Ifthe information at issue is the commercially
sensitive information of a third party, the CEO in this instance must refuse
to disclose such information if the aforementioned criteria are met.
It is section 5.4 that carries the real power for Nalcor. These provisions
effectively exempt Nalcor and the Nalcor Subsidiaries from the broad and

109. ATIPPA, supranote 65.
110. ECNL, supra note 107 at s 5.4(1) [Emphasis added].
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uncertain applications of the ATIPPA. Arguably, under section 5.4(d)(ii),
Nalcor can behave as a company at arm's length. from the government-:.
despite the fact that it is a public body under the ATIPPA. We note, however,
that a full exemption was not given to Nalcor. As a result, Nalcor and the
Nalcor Subsidiaries must still follow the.process outlined in ATIPPA, if
provided with a request from an applicant. This means that Nalcor must
still respond to an access request, if only to say that the existence of the
record is subject to section 5.4(d)(ii) and therefore may be exempted. The
response could be production of a redacted form of the document, or the
very existence of the document could be denied.
The reasons for this exemption are obvious when one contemplates
the realities of working with large companies in the offshore of
Newfoundland and Labrador. Land acquisition in this area is based upon
a secret competitive bid process and information is tightly guarded."'
Third party companies will not deal with a government body in the same
fashion as they would with another third party if they are concerned about
their information being disclosed to competitors or to the public through
an ATIPPA request. This is particularly so in the case of publicly traded
companies, which have additional duties to securities regulators to ensure
that information that may affect stock price is controlled. Also, it is the
purview of a project operator to control the orderly flow of information
relating to a joint venture.
When a government agency compels the release of information,
as happens in the context of royalty administration, a company has no
choice but to abide. Where a company is created by a government to
gather knowledge and information regarding offshore oil and gas and
must therefore form partnerships and relationships with other third party
oil companies, for the relationship to be meaningful, it cannot be based

11.As explained in Newfoundland and Labrador, Department of Natural Resources, 2007 Energy
Plati: Focusing Our Energy, (St. John's, NL: Newfoundland and Labrador Department of Natural
Resources, 2007), online: Department of Natural Resources <http://www.nr.gov.nl.ca/nr/energy/plan/
pdf/energyreport.pdf> at 23 [2007 Energy Plan]: In the offshore, the province proposes to improve
the existing exploration phase process. Currently, companies identify lands they wish to explore
and nominate those lands to the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board
(C-NLOPB). The C-NLOPB decides which lands will be posted for bid, depending on the level of
interest expressed. Following posting, companies "bid" on the lands by offering to spend a specific
amount on seismic or drilling activity. If an Exploration License is awarded, the company then has
five years (extendable to nine years if an acceptable plan is agreed to) to expend the bid amount. If
the bid amount is not fully expended and a significant discovery has not occurred, the companies
must return the exploration rights plus the C-NLOPB retains twenty-five per cent of the unexpended
commitment. The province proposes to improve this phase by ensuring companies outline detailed
plans and timelines for execution for exploration activity, and to establish a reporting and monitoring
program that will ensure the activity is being pursued as planned.
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oh compulsory behavior. To have Nalcor at the table with its partners,
in a fashion that does not allow for the free flow of information, would
defeat its statutorily-prescribed objectives. Indeed, the Government of
Newfoundland and Labrador seeks to "[take an] equity ownership in
projects to ensure first-hand knowledge of how resources are managed, to
share in that management, to foster closer government/industry alignment
'1 2
of interests and to provide an additional source of revenue."
This additional protection was provided to Nalcor and the Nalcor
Subsidiaries in order to ensure that they could work and operate in the
realm of private industry. Without this additional protection, third party
companies would be reluctant to do business with the province's oil
company for fear that their information might be disclosed to the public
through an ATIPPA request.
1. Comparingthe two regimes
When one compares the protections provided for under section 27 of
ATIPPA with those provided under ECNL, it is evident that the compulsory
requirement on a head of a public body not to disclose confidential
information of third parties if it is supplied in confidence and could
reasonably be expected to cause harm, is different than that of section
5.4 of the ECNL. The ECNL requirement states that the CEO shall refuse
to disclose such commercially sensitive information if he or she has
the reasonably held view that the release may harm a party, or is kept
confidential by the owner, or is not customarily provided to competitors.
The CEO under section 5.4 of the ECNL does not have to inquire
whether the information was supplied in confidence or whether it may
cause harm. There is a lengthy definition of what constitutes "commercially

112. 2007 Energy Plan, ibid at 18.
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sensitive information" in the ECNL," 3 but there is no such exhaustive list
in ATIPPA, further broadening the scope around which the CEO may act
under ECNL. This puts the CEO of Nalcor, for example, in a position
where he may act in a fashion entirely consistent with the CEO of a third
party corporation with respect to commercially sensitive information.
Pursuant to the province's energy policy (as articulated in its 2007
Energy Plan: FocusingOur Energy), 4 Nalcor will receive ten percent of
certain new off-shore development projects. "5 When these deals are then
negotiated, one of the main issues will be the exchange of information,
as only where the partners feel completely comfortable will there be a
full exchange of information. Otherwise, Nalcor Oil and Gas can take
an interest in the field, but not get any information that is critical to the
fulfillment of its mandate. The ultimate goal of a company like Nalcor
Oil and Gas is that it will enter the market like a regular oil company and
seek out opportunities and partnerships in satisfaction of its mandate. The
parties may have been forced to the table and compelled to share in the
resource in the case of an energy plan sharing of the field, but without

113. According to section 2(b. 1) of the ECNL, supra note 107:
"[c]ommercially sensitive information" means information relating to the business affairs
or activities of the corporation or a subsidiary, or of a third party provided to the corporation
or the subsidiary by the third party, and includes
(i)
scientific or technical information, including trade secrets, industrial secrets,
technological processes, technical solutions, manufacturing processes, operating
processes and logistics methods,
(ii) strategic business planning information,
(iii)' financial or commercial information, including financial statements, details
respecting revenues, costs and commercial agreements and arrangements respecting
individual business activities, investments, operations or projects and from which
such information may reasonably be derived,
(iv) information respecting positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions developed
for the purpose of contractual or other negotiations by or on behalf of the corporation,
a subsidiary or a third party, or considerations that relate to those negotiations,
whether the negotiations are continuing or have been concluded or terminated,
(v) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information of a third party provided to
the corporation or a subsidiary in confidence,
(vi) information respecting legal arrangements or agreements, including copies of the
agreement or arrangements, which relate to the nature or structure of partnerships,
joint ventures, or other joint business investments or activities,
(vii) economic and financial models used for strategic decision making, including the
information used as inputs into those models, and
(viii) commercial information of a kind similar to that referred to in subparagraphs (i) to
(vii).
114. 2007 Energy Plan, supra note I11.
115. "The [p]rovincial [g]overnment will require a [ten] per cent equity position in future offshore
petroleum projects that require Development Plan approval, where it fits our strategic long-term
objectives." Ibid at 20.
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that compulsion, and comfort level, it is hard to imagine that many deals
involving sensitive commercial information would be successful.
2. Where the shareholderis the Crown
The issue becomes a concern for third parties contracting with a public
body, who share its information with its shareholder, the Crown. Also at
issue is the confidence that third parties have that the public body will
fulfill their duty to keep commercially sensitive information confidential,
in the atmosphere of transparency created by the ATIPPA.116
Once the information has been disseminated to the Crown, the
protection which the corporation has under ECNL is lost.1 7 The Crown,
as shareholder, must be kept apprised of all that its corporate agents are
engaged in, so as to be accountable to the public. To address this, third
party companies have attempted to place onerous requirements on Nalcor
and the Nalcor Subsidiaries. These confidentiality provisions typically
require that Nalcor ensure that any party, including its affiliates and the
Crown, be bound by the same confidentially arrangements.
Government officials must be able to speak generally about the basic
terms and conditions of a Crown corporation's dealings. Inquiries regarding
contractual timeframes around consent to release information or notice
will likely be resisted. These inquiries rob time and resources to identify
what agreement may apply and to comply with same. Politicians generally
do not have the time, nor the appetite to open multiple confidentiality
agreements to answer questions. Price, status of negotiation (unless the
negotiation itself is a secret), parties, and schedule are all facts that could
be refused under section 5.4(l)(d) by the CEO of the public body, but
may in some cases be provided to the Crown shareholder and which a
third party corporation must expect will be disseminated to the public
without notice or authorization, but this is always done per the terms of the
confidentiality agreements in place between the parties. If the information
is of a particularly sensitive nature, that is not the case, but where the
commercial value or level of sensitivity is low (i.e., the date that a given
memorandum of understanding is signed, and the price paid by Nalcor for
a particular license asset per the Energy Plan) the opposing commercial
entity (oil company) will expect that the information will be transmitted
to the Crown and ultimately to the public shareholder. Nalcor, therefore,
must keep an eye to the level of shield that the Crown has available to

116. ATIPPA, supra note 65.
117. ECNL, supranote 107.
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it under section 27 of ATIPPA when reporting commercially sensitive or
confidential matters to its shareholder, the Crown.
For example, contracts that the government has entered into, despite
the fact that they may disclose confidential information, have not been
protected from disclosure by access to information legislation throughout
Canada. Contracts with a public body, however, and the terms and
conditions ofthem, may be the very information that an arm's length partner
in an oil and gas deal may wish be kept confidential. The solution to this
problem is to provide to the Crown basic derivative data and information
without disclosing matters that would be so commercially sensitive as to
be damaging to the third party.
Any requests received by the Crown for these types of information
must pass the third party confidentiality tests of ATIPPA, and any other
confidentiality requirements. One may see the importance of ensuring that
the terms and conditions around any confidentiality agreement between
third parties and a company like Nalcor should be well thought through.
A third party cannot insist upon terms and conditions that would refuse
any disclosure of any information of any sort whatsoever to the Crown.
Additional provisions that require Nalcor to ensure that the Crown or
any other recipient of confidential information, keep it confidential, are
considered reasonable and "market."
Each year an annual report is tabled to the board of directors and
ultimately to the House of Assembly (Provincial Legislature). That
document contains summaries of the activities of the Crown corporation
and budget information, but is specifically drafted with the public eye in
mind so that third party information is protected.118 Therefore, despite
the provisions of the ECNL, by entering into a contract with a Crown
corporation with similar protections, it must be realized that some reporting
latitude must be provided. As an example of wording that could potentially
satisfy and strike the balance between the parties is set out in Appendix B.
For example, a contract where the Crown is a party may be requested
from the Crown and then disclosed. Third party contracts with public bodies
are rarely supplied to the Crown as they require the additional protection of
the ECNL. If it is provided to the Crown under a confidentiality obligation,
the Crown would then be able to resist an ATIPPA request for a copy of that
contract. This is the common concern raised by third party corporations;

118. See, e.g., Nalcor Energy, 2010 Business and FinancialReport, online: Nalcor Energy <http://
www.nalcorenergy.com/uploads/file/nalcor%202010%20business%20and%20financial%20report_
final may%203%20201 1.pdf>.
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they do not want their various agreements, including seismic licensing
agreements, in the public domain.
It is worth noting that almost identical provisions to section 5.4 of the
ECNL were adopted in the Research and Development CouncilAct." 9
3. Canada-Newfoundlandoffshore petroleum board
Adding further to the complexities of the matter, the federal government
of Canada and the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador
may also be able to access certain information about Nalcor's or other
industry participants' activities in the custody or control of the CanadaNewfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (the CNLOPB). In effect, section
18(1) of the Canada-NewfoundlandAtlanticAccordImplementationAct'20
provides that the Federal Minister of Natural Resources and the applicable
Provincial Minister of Newfoundland, without third party consent, may
access any information or documentation relating to petroleum resource
activities in the offshore area that is provided for the purposes of this Act
or any regulation made thereunder.'21
4. Testing the new regime
One of the concerns is whether section 5.4(d)(ii) of the ENCL 2 2 really
changes the game for Nalcor and the Nalcor Subsidiaries. Can Nalcor
simply refuse disclosure in most instances? The companies that deal with
Nalcor expect such a response, but as of the date of this paper, this section
has yet to be judicially considered. Balanced against that shield is that the
ATIPPA is drafted with the spirit of disclosure, and as a public body, Nalcor
ought to follow that spirit, to the extent that it can within its exemptions.
Recent decisions from the courts of Newfoundland and Labrador
regarding solicitor-client privilege (as well as an amendment to theATIPPA)
highlight the potential issue and its partial resolution. In Newfoundland
andLabrador (Informationand Privacy Commissioner) v. Newfoundland
andLabrador (Attorney General), 23 a request was made of the Crown to
119. Research and Development CouncilA ct, SNL 2008, c R-13, s 21.
120. Canada-NewfoundlandAtlantic Accord ImplementationAct, SC 1987, c 3 [Accords Act].
121. The Accords Act, ibid has defined "offshore area" to mean
those submarine areas lying seaward of the low water mark of the Province and extending,
at any location, as far as
(a) any prescribed line, or
(b) where no line is prescribed at that location, the outer edge of the continental margin or
a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea of Canada is measured, whichever is the greater[.]
122. ECNL, supra note 107.
123. Newfoundland and Labrador (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Newfoundland and
Labrador (Attorney General), 2011 NLCA 69, rev'g Imperial Tobacco Co v Newfoundland and
Labrador(AG), 2007 NLTD 172, 276 Nfld & PE1R 123.
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produce solicitor-client privileged material. The Crown refused to disclose
even the existence of such material, the privacy commissioner challenged
this and the -matter landed before Justice Marshall. She ruled that matters
of solicitor-client privilege ought to be determined by ajudge, and not by a
privacy commissioner, in that the privacy commissioner does not have the
same independence as a court and does not have the power to determine
legal rights, despite their ability to compel production. On appeal, however,
Harrington JA, for the Court of Appeal, found that s. 52 of the ATIPPA
was "unambiguous and explicitly permits the Commissioner to abrogate d
claim to solicitor-client privilege in order to verify the legitimacy of such
1 24
a claim in the discharge of his statutory mandate.'
In a possible reaction to this decision, s. 52 of the ATIPPA was
amended in 2012125 to provide that the commissioner has the power to
compel production of records from a public body "...except any record
which contains information that is solicitor and client privileged or which
is an official cabinet record" (s. 52(2)), and that the obligation on the head
of a public body to provide such records does not extend to information
which is solicitor and client privileged (s. 52(4)).
In Imperial Tobacco Co. v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney
General)126 the Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court was asked to
review the Government of Newfoundland's decision to rely on solicitorclient privilege as the basis of denying a request to access a contingency
fee agreement that it had entered into with a law firm in Missouri with
respect to its planned legal action against certain tobacco companies. The
court held that the government met the following three criteria to establish
privilege:
(i) there must be a communication between a solicitor, acting in his or
her professional capacity, and the client; (ii) the communication must
entail the seeking or giving of legal advice; and (iii)
27 the communication
must be intended to be confidential by the parties. 1
However, on account that the government had announced its arrangement
publicly, Green CJTD held that it could not subsequently rely on a "selfserving expostfacto assertion of an intention to maihtain [this agreement's]
confidentiality.' 1 28 The additional finding made by the Court was that in

124.
125.
126.
123.
127.
128.

Ibid at para 84.
SNL 2012, c 25, s 28.
Imperial Tobacco Co v Newfoundland and Labrador (AG), 2007 NLTD 172, 276 Nfld & PER
Ibid at para 107 [Emphasis in original].
Ibid at para 113.
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most circumstances the commercial arrangements between the solicitor
29
and client, while confidential, are not subject to legal privilege.1
The other issue that arises in the circumstance where the information
is not owned by a third party partner, but is similar to information owned
by that partner, is whether it would be in the interest of those partners of
a public body to be invited to seek intervener status in the event that an
ATIPPA request is refused and the decision matter is challenged. Watering
down of the section through judicial precedent could have a ripple effect
that would quite arguably threaten the shield surrounding third party
information. However, the mere suggestion to partners that they ought to
expend money to hire lawyers to intervene in a matter that on its face
has nothing to do with them, but the outcome of which could affect their
dealings with the Crown, could have a chilling effect on free-handed
dealing with those public bodies. This too is a bridge yet to be crossed.
The use of confidentiality agreements in advance of the sharing of
confidential information does not change the obligation of Nalcor under
section 5.4 of the ECNL, but it does ensure that if a request is made,
that intervener status may, on the face of the confidentiality agreement,
be applied for, and the provisions of the confidentiality agreement, if in
place, will be available for a remedy. Also, it ensures that when the parties
looking at the information are taking a consideration of the options, the
obligations under the confidentiality agreement will come to mind.
5. Can the existence of the information be denied?
Subsection 12(2) of the ATIPPA sets out the specific cases where the
head of the public body can deny the existence of a record. 30 That the
record may harm a third party's commercial interests is not a specific
exemption. Section 63 of this Act makes it clear that an adjudicative body
that sits on appeal or review of the process cannot order a public body to
disclose information that has the protection of an exemption, even if it is
discretionary.' 3 '
TheATIPPA 132 requires that the information be supplied on a confidential
133
basis and that it be consistently treated that way to meet the exclusion.
The fact that the information was disclosed and the relationship grounded
on the basis of a confidentiality agreement with strict terms relating to
disclosure to third parties, and an obligation on the part of the receiving
129. Ibid.
130. ATIPPA, supra note 65, s 12(2).
131. Ibid, s63.
132. Ibid.
133. Colin McNaim & Christopher Woodbury, Government Information: Access and Privacy
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1992) at 4-10, 5-7 to 5-12.
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party to put forward all reasonable arguments and challenges to disclosure,
may satisfy a court that the information would not have been disclosed had
it been known that it could be released to the public. That is also evidence
in favour of the argument that a competitor of the corporation would not
release the information.
The ATIPPA also has a specific injury test, which states that if
the release would interrupt the flow of information, the release can be
refused.134 Taking section 27(1)(c)(ii) in light of the expectations set up by
the ECNL, 3 5 this section carries more weight.
In the case of a bidder on a contract where the structure of the bid
is revealed and that would compromise the competitive advantage in the
acquisition of future contracts, the form of the bids can be considered
protected information. The fact that the bid was made is not. The evidence
must be detailed and convincing in its quality and cogency to be accepted
prior to a refusal to allow the existence of information to be made under
Ontario's act. 136
Where there is a denial of the existence of information, there will be a
presumption that the information exists. 31 7 The presumption of proof lies
with the public body in refusing access to the record. This makes sense
as the trier of fact has to have some facts around to govern the trial of
the matter. The trier of fact cannot leave the entire factual context in the
realm of the theoretical. The owner of the information would have to
review the information in advance of such a reply to establish the defence
to the disclosure. It would therefore not be enough for the owner of the
information to deny the existence of the information without looking at it
to make the determination that it falls within the exception pleading that
they need not even enter into the exercise because any information would
not normally be shared.
Examples of cases where the very existence of the information would
be denied are cases where the knowledge of the record could threaten
national defence (NATO maneuvers, for example) or in the case of a third
party, where a decision of a public body-a denial of an application for
example, released in advance of the final decision, could adversely affect

134. ATIPPA, supra note 65.
135. ECNL, supranote 107.
136. McNairn & Woodbury, supra note 131 at 4-10 (Order No. PO-1818 of Ontario Information
and Privacy Commissioner, Sept 22 2000 (Re Ministry of National Resources at pp 2-3), Order No
MO-1504 of Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner, 30 January 2002 (Re City of Greater
Sudbury at p 9).
137. McNairn & Woodbury, ibid at 5-9, para 5.5.
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a third party or the case where the disclosure could threaten the safety of
an individual, such as the location of a witness.'38
In the example of a contract entered into between an oil company
and Nalcor, no such impediment to release the existence of the contract
would be ordinarily raised, except perhaps in the case of documents in
advance of formal negotiations, the existence of which could affect the
competitive position or stock price of a third party. There is no explicit
exception for third party documents, but does that mean that the existence
must always otherwise be disclosed? Firstly, it is always open for a
government body to simply not respond. Subsection 12(l)(a) of ATIPPA
allows for a public body to simply refuse access to a record.139 If so, under
section 28 of ATIPPA, notice can be given to a third party of the request
allowing them standing to refuse the information. 40 Where the mere
attendance at a hearing for such a purpose could affect the third party,
it is the writer's belief that the existence of the information ought to be
refused where the mischief created by disclosure would outweigh the
disclosure. Secondly, the notwithstanding provisions of subsection 12(2)
of ATIPPA are not exclusive in that there is nothing to say that these are
the only cases where existence of information may be refused. 14 1 That
door remains open, from an interpretative perspective. Taking the simple
example of the staking of mining claims, if a competitor asked if one was
out in the field the previous day, or where they had been looking around,
or where they intended to stake a claim, even the acknowledgement would
be refused. Considering that the knowledge of the existence of a record is
in and of itself information, and would not be disclosed to a competitor,
such information ought to fall within the scope of section 5.4(l)(d) as
information that would not customarily be disclosed to a competitor,
despite section 12 of ATIPPA which sets out the specific exemptions for
142
refusal to acknowledge existence.
a. Severance
One of the issues relating to the denial of the existence of information is
the concept of severance. The ATIPPA allows for severance in subsection
7(2), where the document can be severed. 43 It is reasonable to conclude,
therefore, that in some instances, one record may support several facts
(e.g. in the case of an email, for example, that the record exists, the time
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Ibid at 5-10, para 5.5.
ATIPPA supra note 65, s 12(l)(a).
Ibid, s 28.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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of the conversation, the parties to the conversation and the contents of the
dialogue). Each of them may be subject to a separate analysis with respect
to whether or not it is subject to an exemption. It ought not therefore be a
stretch to conclude that the existence of the record itself may provide such
information as may hurt the interests of a third party or which might, under
the ECNL exclusion, be information that-would not normally be shared
with competitors.'"
b. Mediation materialand its treatment under ATIPPA
Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney General) v. Newfoundland and
Labrador (Information and Privacy Commissioner)45 and Newfoundland
and Labrador (Attorney General) v. Newfoundland and Labrador
(Information and Privacy Commissioner)4 6 are cases that involved the
requested disclosure of mediation materials prepared in the course of a
dispute between the parties. As they were- not the subject of a specific
exemption, the requesting party asked for them. The court found that
there were strong policy reasons to extend the privilege to mediation
materials even though the materials were not protected under solicitorclient privilege, nor were they subject to privilege according to any rule of
evidence and the matter was not in court. The court applied the Wigmore
test as set out by the Supreme Court in Slavutych v Baker'47 :
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The communication must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed;
The element of confiderntiality must be essential to the maintenance
of the relationship in which the communications arose;
The relationship must be one which, in the opinion the community,
ought to be "sedulously fostered"; and
The injury caused to the relationship by disclosure of the
communication must be greater than the benefit gained for the
correct disposal of the litigation.

In the case of a request to a public body, the first two elements of the test
are met due to the confidentiality, agreements and context. Confidentiality
is absolutely critical to open frank discussion between the parties. As
for the third, there is significant public interest in maintaining a level of
secrecy and confidentiality when dealing with third party oil companies.

144. McNairn & Woodbury, supra note 131 at 5-2 1.
145. NewfoundlandAG, supra note 123.
146. Newfoundland and Labrador (AG) v Newfoundland and Labrador (Information and Privacy
Commissioner), 2010 CarswellNfld 40 (NLTD) (WL Can).
147. Slavutych v Baker, [1976] 1 SCR 254.
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The public body, in the case of Nalcor, was conceived to behave
in a manner consistent with the rules of third parties, and the enacting
legislation in section 5.4 of the ECNL contemplated the maintenance of
such confidentiality. As for the fourth part of the test, the injury would
be the chilling effect over the flow of information from third party
companies, which would make the stated purpose of public bodies, such
as Nalcor, impossible to achieve. Any good that would be achieved in
releasing the information would undo the good contemplated in setting up
148
the corporation on the first instance.
A class of privilege was created for the purposes of the Act, which was
neither solicitor-client nor evidentiary based, but one which, if breached,
would threaten the integrity of the system. This shows that there are
circumstances where a court can see past the specific exemptions to create
good policy, thereby extending the exemptions to disclosure.
c. Royalty regulationsas a model
Under the provincial royalty regulations, a great deal of data is required for
the royalty taker to ensure that it receives its proper royalty entitlement.
There are specific sections of the regulations that deal with this information.
Here the information is subject to ATIPPA, but it is an offence for anyone
49
employed in the administration of the regulations to use it improperly.1
Conclusion
ATIPPA and associated provisions of the ECNL work to strike a balance
between government transparency and the goal of creating public bodies
that can work with third party companies while maintaining a level of
confidentiality to enable a free flow of information between them.
Notwithstanding the lack of judicial consideration regarding these
relatively new statutes, well-worded confidentiality agreements will likely
suffice to allow for the movement of information between the parties and
sufficient for the government to comment publicly on the issues and with
facts that the public body is responsible for, and to satisfy the requirements
of the ATIPPA. It is anticipated that this will provide companies in the oil
and gas industry with certain comfort when dealing with Nalcor and the
Nalcor Subsidiaries.
Given the increased frequency with which access to information statutes
in Canada will be relied upon to gain material commercial information
148. Kris Klein & Denis Kratchanov, The Klein & Kratchanov Report: The Canadian Sourcefor
Legal Developments in Privacy andAccess, Vol 2 Issue 8 (Scarborough: Carswell, 2010), reporting on
Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v Blood Tribe Departmentof Health, 2008 SCC 44, [2008] 2 SCR
574, per Abella J.
149. Royalty Regulations, 2003 under the Petroleum and NaturalGas Act, NL R 71/03, s 47.
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about the activities, prospects and strategies of the private parties in the
hands of the government, it is expected that the jurisprudence considering
such legislation will expand in time to provide additional colour to the
ability of the government to protect a third party's confidential information
from its competitors, the media, and other members of the public. As
this body of law develops, oil industry participants will be able to better
determine how to structure their interactions with government by relying
upon the protections afforded by contract law, the common law, and the
foregoing access to information legislation.
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Appendix A

Comparison of "Disclosure Harmful to Business Interests of a Third
Party" Provisions in Various Access to Information Legislation in Canada
There are three common structures in the statutory provisions of the
provinces and territories, and a fourth, unique format in the federal statute.
The Alberta Act'50 format is the most common, and is shared by British
Columbia, Ontario, Yukon, Nova Scotia, PEI, and Newfoundland and
Labrador. A second format is reflected in the Saskatchewan, Northwest
Territories, and Nunavut statutes. A third format is seen in the Manitoba
and New Brunswick statutes.
The following provides an overview of the difference between the
federal and each of the provincial "disclosure harmful to business interests
of a third party" provisions. For further details, see also the attached table
comparing these applicable sections set out below.
1. Alberta
The outline of the relevant section of the Alberta Act is a mandatory
refusal to disclose certain information based on three criteria, followed by
a separate provision requiring refusal to disclose tax-related information,
and lastly, exceptions where disclosure may be permitted. Alberta and the
six provinces and territories following have substantially the same outline,
with variations noted in the analysis below.
a. Mandatory Refusal to Disclose
The first subsection provides criteria as to when refusal to disclose is
mandatory. First,-the information must fall within one of two categories,
"trade secrets" or "commercial, financial, labour. relations, scientific or
technical information." Second, the information must be supplied to the
public body, explicitly or implicitly, in confidence. Third, disclosure of the
information must be expected to have one of the following effects:
• harm significantly the competitive position or interfere significantly
with the negotiating position of the third party;
• result in similar information no longer being supplied to the public
body when it is in the public interest that similar information
continue to be supplied;
* result in undue financial loss or gain to any person or organization;
or
150. Alberta Act, supra note 51.
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*

reveal information supplied to, or the report of, an arbitrator,
mediator, labour relations officer or other person or body appointed
to resolve or inquire into a labour relations dispute.

A second subsection requires a public body to refuse to disclose when the
information requested was collected on a tax return or collected for the
purpose of determining tax liability of collecting a tax.
Exceptions
The third subsection provides for four scenarios where the mandatory
refusal does not apply. They are the following:
* the third party consents to the disclosure;
* an enactment of Alberta or Canada authorizes or requires the
information to be disclosed,
" the information relates to a nonarm's length transaction between a
public body and another party; or
* the information is in a record that is in the custody or under the
control of the Provincial Archives of Alberta or the archives of a
public body and has been in existence for fifty years or more.
2. Ontario
a. MandatoryRefusal to Disclose
While the structure of the OntarioAct is slightly different, the three criteria
for mandatory refusal to disclose are found in much the same language.
Like the Alberta Act, the OntarioAct has a separate provision mandating
refusal to disclose tax-related information.'51
Exceptions
The Ontario Act allows the public body discretion to disclose when the
third party consents to the disclosure.
3. British Columbia
a. Mandatory Refusal to Disclose
The BC Act has virtually identical criteria for refusal to disclose.'52 Like
the Alberta Act, the BC Act has a separate provision mandating refusal to
disclose tax-related information.

151. Ontario Act, supra note 67, s 17.
152. BCAct, supra note 68, s 21.
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Exceptions
The BC Act provisions are only overruled when the third party consents to
the disclosure or the information is in archives and has been in existence
for fifty years or more, two of four exceptions in the Alberta Act.
4. Yukon
a. Mandatory Refusal to Disclose
The Yukon Act153 has virtually identical criteria for refusal to disclose. Like
the Alberta Act, the Yukon Act has a separate provision mandating refusal
to disclose tax-related information.
Exceptions
The Yukon Act provisions are only overruled when the third party consents
to the disclosure. Furthermore, the mandatory refusal to disclose tax
related information does not apply to records under the Assessment and
Taxation Act that describe a property and the assessment of the property.
5. Nova Scotia
a. Mandatory Refusal to Disclose
The Nova Scotia Act154 has virtually identical criteria for refusal to
disclose. Like the AlbertaAct, the Nova ScotiaAct has a separate provision
mandating refusal to disclose tax-related information.
Exceptions
The Nova Scotia Act provisions are only overruled when the third
party consents to the disclosure.
Other Variations
This section of the Nova Scotia Act also includes mandatory disclosure for
reports prepared in the course of routine inspections by an agency that is
authorized to enforce compliance with an enactment.
6. PrinceEdward Island
a. MandatoryRefusal to Disclose
The PrinceEdwardIslandAct, 55 has-virtually identical criteria for refusal
to disclose. Like the Alberta Act, the Prince Edward Island Act has a
separate provision mandating refusal to disclose tax-related information.

153. Access to Information and Protection of PrivacyAct, RSY 2002, c 1, s 24.
154. FIPPA, supranote 678, s 21.
155. PrinceEdwardIsland Act, supranote 68, s 14.
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Exceptions
The Prince Edward Island Act has virtually identical exceptions to the
mandatory refusal to disclose.
7.

Newfoundland and Labrador

a. MandatoryRefusal to Disclose
The ATIPPA has virtually identical criteria for refusal to disclose. Like
the Alberta Act, the ATIPPA has a separate provision mandating refusal to
disclose tax-related information.
Exceptions
The ATIPPA provisions are only overruled where the third party consents
to the disclosure or the information is in archives and has been in existence
for fifty years or more, two of four exceptions in the Alberta Act.
8. Saskatchewan
The relevant section of the Saskatchewan statute follows a somewhat
different outline. While much of the language is similar to the AlbertaAct,
the outline first includes a mandatory refusal to disclose records containing
15 6
various types of information, followed by.listed exceptions to the rule.
This is different than the three criteria plus exceptions structure seen in the
Alberta Act. Two territories (Northwest Territories and Nunavut) follow
the Saskatchewan Act outline.
a. Mandatory Refusal to Disclose
The Saskatchewan Act, requires disclosure of a record to be refused if
it contains any of six types of information. While some of the types of
information are similar to the criteria in the Alberta Act, the following are
not seen in the Alberta Act in any format:
*

*

0

a statement of financial account relating to a third party with
respect to the provision of routine services from a government
institution;
a statement of financial assistance provided to a third party by
a prescribed'Crown corporation'that is a government institution;
and
information supplied by a third party to support an application for
financial assistance.

Absent from the SaskatchewanAct is the requirement that information not
be disclosed if it will result in the information no longer being supplied

156. Saskatchewan Act, supra note 69, s 19.

162

The Dalhousie Law Journal

to the public body. The Saskatchewan Act also contains no provision
mandating refusal to disclose tax-related information.
Exceptions
Of the exceptions seen in the Alberta Act, the Saskatchewan Act allows
a public body discretion to disclose a record only where the third party
consents to the disclosure. The SaskatchewanAct also allows an additional
discretion for a public body to disclose a record if it is in the public
interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the
environment, and if the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any
financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position, and interference
with contractual or other negotiations of a third party.
9. Northwest Territories
a. MandatoryRefusal to Disclose
The Northwest Territories Act' 57 has substantially the same structure as
the Saskatchewan Act. The Northwest TerritoriesAct requires disclosure
of a record to be refused if it contains any of the six types of information
listed in the Saskatchewan Act. The Northwest TerritoriesAct includes a
seventh type of information, tax-related information, which is similar to
the provision seen in the Alberta Act.
Exceptions
The Northwest TerritoriesAct allows the public body discretion to disclose
where the third party consents to the disclosure or if an act or regulation of
the Northwest Territories or Canada authorizes or requires the disclosure.
These are two of the four exceptions seen in the Alberta Act.
10. Nunavut
a. MandatoryRefusal to Disclose
The NunavutAct 58 has substantially the same structure as the Saskatchewan
Act. The Nunavut Act requires disclosure of a record to be refused if it
contains any of the six types of information listed in the Saskatchewan
Act. The Nunavut Act includes a seventh type of information, tax-related
information, similar to the Alberta Act.
Exceptions
The Nunavut Act allows the public body discretion to disclose where
the third party consents to the disclosure or if an act or regulation of the
157. Nortnvest TerritoriesAct, supra note 69, s 24.
158. Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNWT (Nu) 1994, c 20, s 24 [Nunavut
Act].
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Northwest Territories or Canada authorizes or requires the disclosure.
These are two of the four exceptions seen in the AlbertaAct.
11. Manitoba
The relevant section of the Manitoba statute provides a third general outline.
It requires a public body to refuse disclosure that would reveal certain
information, followed by a mandatory refusal for tax-related information,
and finally, exceptions. This is different from the three criteria seen in the
Alberta Act and slightly different that records containing certain types of
information as seen in the Saskatchewan Act. The New Brunswick statute
follows the same structure.
a. MandatoryRefusal to Disclose
The Manitoba Act, 5 9 requires a public body to "refuse to disclose...
information that [will] reveal" any of the three following types of
information:
(a) a trade secret of a third party;
(b) commercial, financial, labour relations, scientific or technical
information supplied to the public body by a third party, explicitly
or implicitly, on a confidential basis and treated consistently as
confidential information by a third party; or
(c) commercial, financial, labour relations, scientific or technical
information the disclosure of which could reasonably be
expected to [have a number of effects, the same as those listed in
the Alberta Act criteria.]"
Much of the language used is similar to the Alberta Act, with a different
structure. Of note is the additional requirement that information supplied
confidentially must also be treated as such consistently by the third party.
Like the Alberta Act, the ManitobaAct has a separate provision mandating
refusal to disclose tax-related information.
Exceptions
The ManitobaAct includes two of the four exceptions found in the Alberta
Act but does not provide an exception for archived records over fifty years
old or information relating to a non-arm's length transaction. There are also
additional exceptions to the mandated refusal to disclose. These include
information that is publicly available and information that discloses the
final results of a product or environmental test conduct by or for the public
body, unless the test was done for. a fee paid by the third party. Lastly,

159. ManitobaAct, supranote 68, s 18.
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the Manitoba Act allows a public body discretion to disclose information
if it is in the public interest for the purposes of public health or safety
or protection of the environment, improved competition, or government
regulation of undesirable trade practices.
12. New Brunswick
a. Mandatory Refusal to Disclose
The New Brunswick Act 6 ' is virtually identical to the Manitoba Act,
including a separate provision mandating refusal to disclose tax-related
information.
Exceptions
The New Brunswick Act contains the same exceptions to refusal to disclose
that are seen in the ManitobaAct, including those that are different than
the Alberta Act. The New Brunswick Act allows a public body discretion
to disclose information if it is in the public interest for the purposes of
improved competition or government regulation of undesirable trade
practices.
Other Variations
The New Brunswick Act contains a mandatory disclosure where it is in the
public interest for the purposes of public health or safety or protection of
the environment.
13. Canada
The federal provision has a very different and unique structure. The first
subsection protects much the same information as the Alberta Act but the
second, third and fourth subsections deal with product and environmental
testing and are not addressed here. Two exceptions follow, in subsections
five and six.
a. MandatoryRefusal to Disclose
With regard to third party information, the AIA provides for a mandatory
refusal to disclose the following:
" trade secrets of a third party;
" financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that is
confidential and is treated consistently in a confidential manner
by the third party;
" information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected
to result in material financial loss or gain to, or could reasonably

160. New Brunswick Act, supra note 68.
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*

be expected to prejudice the competitive position of, a third party;
or
information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected
to interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a third party.

While much of the same information is protected under the AIA, there is
no provision for refusal to disclose information that would result in similar
information no longer being supplied to the public body. Nor is tax-related
information protected from disclosure under the Act.
Exceptions
The AIA allows a public body to disclose if the third party consents to the
disclosure. The AIA also allows a public body to disclose the information
protected in subsection one (excluding trade secrets) if the disclosure is in
the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection
of the environment, and the disclosure outweighs any financial loss or
gain, prejudice to security of structure, networks or systems, or prejudice
to competitive position or interference with negotiations of the third party.
Subsections corresponding to the Alberta Act are identified below.
Additional sections which are not found in the Alberta Act are not noted
in the table.
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Appendix B
Sample ContractProvision
The following sample is provided for discussion purposes only and may
not be appropriate in all circumstances. It is important to note that this
sample cannot andshould not replacea careful review ofthe facts and law
applicable in each instance.
4. This Reciprocal Confidentiality Agreement (the RCA) shall not apply
to:
(a) Confidential Information already in possession of the public or
which becomes available to the public other than through: (i) the
act or omission of the Receiving Party; or (ii) the act or omission
of any Person to whom the Confidential Information is disclosed
by the Receiving Party pursuant to this RCA;
(b) Confidential -Information which was or becomes available to the
Receiving Party on a non-confidential basis from a source other
than a Party to this RCA which disclosure is not in breach or
violation of any law or other obligation;
(c) Confidential Information which has been independently acquired
or developed by the Receiving Party or its Representatives without
breaching any of the obligations of this RCA; or
(d) Confidential Information obtained by a Party on a non-confidential
basis pursuant to any applicable. legislation.
5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the Public
Body may, at its discretion, disclose to any Person or entity, including
its shareholders and Affiliates, the existence, general nature, status,
discussions and negotiations taking place concerning the Project
including, but not limited to status, cost, budget and schedule,
6. The Receiving Party or its Representatives may disclose the
Confidential Information to the extent such information is required
to be disclosed under any applicable law. The Receiving Party shall,
prior to such disclosure, provide reasonable notice in writing to
the Disclosing Party so that it may seek a protective order or other
appropriate remedy or waive compliance with the provisions of this
RCA.
7. The Receiving Party may disclose the Confidential Information without
the Disclosing Party's prior written consent to an Affiliate, provided
that the Receiving Party shall be responsible to the Disclosing Party
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for the compliance of such Affiliate with the terms of this RCA as
though such Affiliate were the Receiving Party.
8.

Subject to paragraph 9 and 10, the Receiving Party shall be entitled to
disclose the Confidential Information without the Disclosing Party's
prior written consent to each of its Representatives to the extent that
such Representative has a clear need to know in connection with the
Project.

9. The Receiving Party shall be responsible for ensuring that all Persons
to whom the Confidential Information is disclosed under this RCA
shall keep such information strictly confidential, shall not disclose or
divulge the same to any unauthorized Person, and shall comply with
the use restrictions set forth in this RCA and any requirement to return
or destroy such Confidential Information.
10. The Receiving Party and its Representatives shall only use or permit
the use of the Confidential Information disclosed under this RCA in
connection with the Project.
11. (a) The Parties agree that disclosure of the Confidential Information
for purposes other than those set out in this RCA could reasonably
be expected to result in undue financial loss or gain to the Parties or
others, and could reasonably be expected to harm significantly the
competitive position or interfere significantly with the negotiating
position of the Disclosing Party.
(b) The Parties acknowledge that the Province, the Public Body and
its Affiliates are, at all times relevant to this RCA, subject to the
provisions of Newfoundland and Labrador legislation as such
legislation may be amended or varied, including, but not limited
to, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNL
2002, c A-I .1 as amended (ATIPPA) and the Energy Corporation
Act, SNL 2007, c P-I 1.01, as amended (ECNL). The Parties
acknowledge that the Province, the Public Body's Affiliates
may incur disclosure obligations pursuant to the provisions of
ATIPPA or other provincial legislation, and disclosure pursuant
to such an obligation shall not be a breach of this RCA. To the
extent the Confidential Information supplied meets the third party
confidential information tests set out in ATIPPA or commercially
sensitive information tests set out in the ECNL, section 27 of
ATIPPA or section 5.4 of the ECNL, as applicable, such sections
will require the Province to assert and maintain its assertion that
disclosure of.such information be refused if requested by a third
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party. Where there is a challenge to such refusal, a review by the
Access to Information and Privacy Commissioner, and ultimately
the Supreme Court of Newfoundland Trial Division may occur.
The Public Body will support the Disclosing Party in its arguments
in support of non-disclosure under ATIPPA and the ECNL at each
step in the process.

